you aren't wrong

>Couldn't it be argued that having feelings about these things is irrational because theres no way it could possibly affect you when you're dead?

It's true if you think about your feelings but sometimes there are other people you should consider.

Example: I plan to format all my HDDs before killing myself because my parents wouldn't be very happy to find out I'm a pedo (even if it's just 2D).

>>22508
I keep all my flash drives in a small box I made in a science project.

There's a specific way you need to open it. The obvious way will also open it but will trigger a pin which will break a glass vial of acid that sits directly above the flash drives. But opening another part of it won't break the vial.

>>22508
You could password protect your drives / use linux

>>22507
I think I possibly am wrong, for the reasons outlined in the podcast linked above.

Imagine you are working on medical research to cure cancer and the world will end 30 days after you die, do you feel your work would be pointless?
(the assumption is that cancer can be cured but not in your lifetime, which might be a dumb assumption and it ignores the other, more immediate benefits the research could provide)

I cant think of any similar arguments from my own life. But isn't it preferable to live in a society where people pursue those kind of long term goals?

>>22525
he says that things matter because people care about more than themselves. so if you don't care that people find porn on your PC, then it doesn't matter - if you do care, then it does.

to answer your original point, the answer to whether it's irrational to care about the the world after your death, comes down to whether there is a rational basis for the world being in some state. so if it's rationally verified that people not dieing from cancer is a good thing, then working on a cancer cure that won't be completed until long after your death is rationally time well spent. if you don't care about other people, then there isn't much reason for you to be convinced that it matters. whether or not you would be wrong, well, i wouldn't know. do you want to be convinced one way or the other?

>>22521
And what if you turn it upside down and then open it?

>>22506
>Prove me wrong!
It depends on your given set of values (axiology) and your very notion of existence (ontology), of course. Just like some people might prefer looking good than feeling good at some circumstances (e.g. ballet dancers on stage), for some people it can be most important the permanent biographical/literary character they might inspire than the petty experiences they might embody and portray during their mundane actual lives. If, on a Berkeley-esque line, esse est percipi (being is [merely] being perceived), this mindset could even become a must.