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File 138436997356.jpg - (11.56KB , 220x258 , 220px-OttoWeiningerspring1903.jpg )
2647 No. 2647 [Edit]
Let us talk about philosophy. I read quite a bit of it and have also gotten deeply into mysticism, theology and psychoanalysis.

Existentialism - Main point is that humans are entirely responsible for themselves, which I do agree with, but the central claim is that God does not exist (and if he did, it wouldn't matter); this I think more or less is a fatal flaw, by ignoring the ultimate and the unknowable. However, I will say that I find Sartre's usage of psychoanalysis to be very interesting.

Nihilism - I don't know all that much about it, but I still like it a lot more than Existentialism. The idea of looking into the darkness and seeing the entirety of everything, rather than realizing that there is nothing, very much appeals to me. I also like Nietzsche's idea that man is constanly striving to reach the level of God, which I think is basically true.

Process Philosophy - I really like the works of Whitehead. I think that the philosophy is basically true, but needs to be refined. I'm in the process of doing that right now, although I still have to gain a few more levels in the philosophy realm.

That is all I can think of for now. Feel free to discuss philosophy.
8 posts omitted. Last 50 shown. Expand all images
>> No. 2693 [Edit]
Have you ever seen In Treatment? At a certain point (right before announcing that he has lost all faith in his profession and is going to quit), Paul Weston says:

"Maybe any serious communication between two people is useless. Even when they're outright lying, people only hear what they really want to hear or what they're capable of hearing, which often holds very little resemblance with what is actually said... [So] I can't tell what is real."

I've found this to be probably the most important and persistent problem within the human condition. Not injustice, not violence, not the failure of any meaningful category but the problem of them computing at all; the problem of communication; the problem of language, as an alleged bridge between one and the others, between one and the world (don't even get me started against perception, empirism and such). It is precisely because communication and language are central to me, that I have taken them as subjects of study (rather than taking them for granted) and so can't disregard neither their inner problems, nor the conclusions about our experience that apparently more accurate models of their structure seem to entail (key word: structuralism... and its limits).

>Would the "true" you become only a winner of mind games and not much else?
If you followed me in the least, you'd see the most we can ever achieve is awareness and control over the games that our mind plays to us, for it's all we'll ever get to know (as humans; therefore, optimistically enough, I'm now a transhumanist).
>> No. 2694 [Edit]
So you wouldn't believe it's possible to follow your train of thought without coming to the same conclusions that you did?
>> No. 2698 [Edit]
No, it's actually far worse than that: due to the aforementioned equivocal functioning of language, I have no means to tell if anyone has ever truly followed me, either if they agree (and thus are able to reproduce what I say and explain it back acceptably) or disagree (and thus are capable of refuting me); all I can do is derive judgements exclusively from my own interpretations of what they say (as always)...

But don't sweat it. In that case, I just played with >>2689's derogatory calling of schools of thought as "mind games" to tell him that he should distrust the games of his own mind as well.
>> No. 2706 [Edit]
I've become interested in Stoicism recently, I used to be interested in objectivism but I dropped it after the Is Ought issue. Is there any inherent problems with stoicism?
>> No. 2726 [Edit]
I love the ideas put forth by Quine, Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer, Kant, Hume, Diogenes, Marcus Aurelius, and the Buddha!
>> No. 2729 [Edit]
It argues in favor of living naturally. What exactly is natural life?
>> No. 2730 [Edit]
I'm not smart enough to follow philosophy, excepting the occasional phrase.
Even if I were, what would it matter? There is no meaning, no truth, nothing to live for. At least for someone as unremarkable as me. Why should I burden myself with reading things that will still give no solution to suffering? And every idea I have ever had has been said more precisely by people far more intelligent than I could ever hope to be. So why am I bothering with this since this has been said by pretty much every person who ever existed. I'm so so so sick of existence. I hate everything. Fuck.
>> No. 2731 [Edit]
Philosophers gave different solutions to suffering. Some of them agreed with one solution (from myriads of solution). It's death. It's an important subject to discuss.

Some argued that there are two deaths, conceivably speaking. The first is the usual real, biological death. It's unremarkable because, well, if I die why the fuck should I care? The question just stops there and no more. The second is 'death' in a more sinister sense. For instance, we can still 'live' while being 'dead' at the same time. I'm experiencing a living death, as a zombie or something. 'Dying inside', as one commonly puts it. My hand moves on its own, my emotion comes out itself. I pretend that I'm still living, when to be honest I've been dead since a long time ago. I'm the Hamlet (idiot version) who chose 'not-be', instead of 'to be' or 'not to be' in the face of suffering. A fictional suffering; fictional, because it takes an idiot megalomaniac like me to perceive that this bare universe is somehow against me and my life.

But how is it possible that many other people are as idiotic and megalomaniac like me, as each of them suffer the same 'living death' as me? Let us suppose that there is society, in a general term. Is it then conceivable to think of a society which consists of generic idiocy and megalomania as its characteristics? I'd like to think of it for a moment. Maybe you can help me. I'm dying here. (And I can imagine Elliot Rodger laughing sarcastically at me, saying something like 'ha ha I was right!', and so on.)
>> No. 2747 [Edit]
Please bear in mind I have had no formal philosophy courses or research.
It sounds odd, but lately I have been thinking a lot more about the belief that we all have a spiritual energy of sorts that we can give to the world around us. By giving to and appreciating something, the object/animal/character gains value that it didn't have before. For example, without somebody there to appreciate it, a mountain is just a giant convex rock. However once I lay eyes on it and see the beauty, the mountain is now a breathtaking landscape.
The same thing goes for people. Nobody can give themselves value unless somebody else recognizes it and gives praise. In my opinion, setting goals "for yourself" is meaningless. Everybody does it so somebody else will notice and admire it. Please point out holes and stuff if you can, because I want to improve my theory.
>> No. 2755 [Edit]
>the belief that we all have a spiritual energy of sorts that we can give to the world around us
>Nobody can give themselves value unless somebody else recognizes it and gives praise.
>I want to improve my theory.

Three words, man:

Esse est percipi

...or To be is to be perceived, the founding principle of Berkeley's philosophy in "A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge". Dig it; it'll give you a good starting point.

For now, I could tell you that your thoughts of beauty about the mountain effectively turn it into something else, but just insofar as a perceived object: that the "mountain" of the "breathtaking landscape" is not the same mountain that might (or not) exist out there, but merely a fabrication of your senses and cognition given some circumstances that include angle, distance, light, cultural heritage, your own mood, consumption of psychoactive drugs, etc. So, you see, it's not that your spirit or thought is beautifying far away mountains, but merely reconfiguring your very own thoughts of them. Or, like the Matrix kid would put it: it is not the spoon that bends, it is only yourself. The most shocking thing is that, to solve the conflict between the actual and the perceived, both Berkeley and the Matrix kid reached the same conclusion: there is no spoon; the "spoon", just like the "mountain", exist insofar as such only as constructs in your mind; since we are caged inside perception, unstable perceptions are all which existence we can assert and, therefore, to be at all is to be perceived by some mind; whatever it is that is out there (if at all), it's certainly not a spoon or a mountain or whatever is reported by perception-biased ideas, so either the world itself is the "ideal" realm or our lives and everything we can possibly know and care about does not occur in the world at all.

For better or worst, such insights might effectively lead you into post-structuralism. From there, your specific concern about the spiritual and otherness might at some point lead you to Paul Ricoeur ("Oneself as another), whereas your concern about value might lead you to Baudrillard ("The system of Objects" and beyond). However, postmodern philosophy is quite hard to chew so take your time.
>> No. 2759 [Edit]
File 141832896760.jpg - (112.96KB , 632x788 , poststructuralism animated.jpg )
This isn't half bad as an introduction:

Animating Poststructuralism
>> No. 2760 [Edit]
Thank you for the information!
>> No. 2761 [Edit]
>Nobody can give themselves value unless somebody else recognizes it and gives praise. In my opinion, setting goals "for yourself" is meaningless. Everybody does it so somebody else will notice and admire it. Please point out holes and stuff if you can, because I want to improve my theory.

I'm sure you've already come to this conclusion yourself, but those theories are untrue under the philosophical ideas explained in >>2755. Because we are all bound by our own perceptions, our goals, ideas, and so forth cannot be given value by another's perceptions unless we personally choose to give their views inherent value (say, for example, striving to live up to a family member's expectations). It's up to the individual to decide whether the influence of other people will set or change the value of their goals.
>> No. 2766 [Edit]
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That sounds correct enough.

However, since the mind does not construct from nothing, it still stands that otherness predates oneness: that you do need others (things and specially people) around you in order to conform and judge your own sense of identity. Without boundaries around it, the individual mind effectively disappears.

Post edited on 12th Dec 2014, 5:57pm
>> No. 2767 [Edit]
This is Jacques Lacan, structuralist psychoanalyst from the 70's:

Bear with him a little (he wasn't the most ductile or transparent speaker) and you might find very stimulating ideas about death, love, education, science's current place in history and, above all, the pernicious and inescapable influence of language in our lives, seriously questioning the possibility of freedom at all.
>> No. 2770 [Edit]
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The other day I felt extremely down and (apart from going to the pee) I couldn't even leave my bed for 48 hours straight, doing nothing but sleeping or trying to. Near the end I had a sort of psychotic episode, in which I could have a chat with an inner voice that turned out to be an amazing shortcut to several ideas I couldn't pinpoint precisely before; after that, I could finally sleep peacefully for a bit and get up the next morning. Here are some of the highlights of that self-encounter.

[ME:] Let's see... tell me, for instance, what's the secret of comedy?
>[VOICE:] Cruelty. It's not at all about the argument but about the induced relation between the public and the characters. Just like tragedy revolves around making you feel pity for the characters as you sorrow their pain, comedy is what leads you to enjoy their pain thus revolving about a sense of cruelty. Aristotle somewhat let this show in the Poetics when he said that tragedy characters must be respectable, whereas comedy characters not.
OK, getting serious now. Do I love mai waifu?
>No. However, you did love *****.
That's horseshit! I couldn't correspond her for the life of mine, that was precisely the problem.
>But it really was love.
OK, then just tell me: according to you, what is love?
>[takes his time] Simply put: wanting to die for someone; and an act of love is to effectively die for someone (yes, as in christian mercy).
Holly shi... and what is happiness?
>To find love, of course. That's why you aren't happy. You were correct enough with your functional definition of "wanting to become one with someone (else)" but, as you know, you cannot ever do it literally due the otherness-based order of the world, so the most you can ever do is "eliminating the difference between you and someone", that is, giving you own existence away for the sake of your beloved.
And what about the other way or eros? I mean: wanting to posses someone, or assimilating that existence into yours?...
>Oh, that's hate: wanting to kill someone (not just to die, but to kill it). Remember: you did literally wanted to die or give your life away for *****; even in therapy, you insisted that you shouldn't be getting help at all but, instead, it should be her; the last time you saw her at the subway, you even thought that you'd be perfectly ok if she just pushed you down the railways right there, as all you ever wanted was to die for her sake; it was terrifying, unbearable, which is why you absolutely had to run away (that is, for love, not for the guilt induced by the lack of it). Fortunately you did stop loving her at some point.
You mean when the other 3Ds and characters came?
>No, that was just lust, plain and simple, nothing to do with love. On the other hand, you did wanted to kill your mother with your own hands (that time with the ladder, remember?); so, you have effectively loved ***** and hated your mother, but not your waifu... or say: would you like to die for her or her to die for you?
[thinks about it] I think I never wanted to but actually did, both ways. You see, the problem here is acknowledgement: it's not just killing or dying for someone, one wants said otherness to acknowledge that we're doing it for her. With mai waifu, I cannot ever get that answer and her existence, as such, is entirely bounded to my own take on her; so I have effectively "killed" her most canonical self in order to fit her transformed character within me, but I also effectively "sacrificed" my old self and life completely (you can't possibly deny that) in order to fit in with what I learned from her material source and turn into a suitable "2D lover" for her. So, animically or spiritually speaking, I pretty much "died" myself and "killed" her in order to make us into the halves of one inseparable sign. By all means, I want us to die together.
>Well, if you say so, I'm not sure. If true, you'd have a legitimate "love-hate" relationship with her.
It sounds pretty all-encompassing but unsatisfying nonetheless...
>That's because you haven't died yet, neither actually accepted that you will.
But why all this obsession with death? Why happiness, which is something we relate with holding to life, is given by finding love which is bound to death?
>Because what we hold to is not life in itself but life as a condition of possibility for sense: what we really need is sense, and that only comes with an end, that is, with death. As you learned from Baudrillard, an endless process is always nonsensical.
But that idea is just wrong. Say, if I build a series of Pair, Prime, or Fibonacci numbers, they give me an endeless set alright but which makes perfect sense as a whole (I mean: it's a well defined set).
>But that is a mathematical, arithmetic or logical sense. What we do need in our lives, as you know, is narrative sense which does need of a beginning and an end. Moreover, is precisely the acknowledgment of ourselves as beings who are born, live and finally die, that the abstract concept of narrative arc has its foundation on, as well as Heidegger's "being-towards-death", Einsenstein theory of Montage, Peirce's triadic model of sign and every trikonic structure in general. Love is defined so strongly around death because it's the ultimate provider of meaning within a narrative-based view of life.
But then... does that mean that in a world free from death there can't be love anymore? I mean: there won't be love in a transhuman or posthuman world?
>Not necessarily. If we give credit to entropy, A.I. are bound to crash at some point just like any other machine.
Yeah, but that'd be just a conceptual emulation of human love. My question is: is it possible for an entirely new form of love to arise in a machine world?
>I don't know. By the very definition of Technological Singularity, none of us can possibly know right now. However, whatever might exist there, I don't think it'd be quite legitimate to still call it love.
So, are you telling me that, in order to protect love, I actually have to become humanist again? to somehow treasure the human condition back again?
>Not necessarily. However, you do have to acknowledge some form of finitude or death alright.
I see... Thank you. By the way: am I what one would call mad?
>Well, you already called this a "psychotic" episode yourself, so...
No, but I mean: what is it to be mad, really? to be out of (one's own) control?
>Partly, but also to cogitate without sufficient reason.
So... am I?
>. . . [voice stops]

Post edited on 15th Dec 2014, 8:52pm
>> No. 2771 [Edit]
That cliffhanger
>> No. 2779 [Edit]
File 141927483518.jpg - (36.90KB , 555x479 , Laws of Logic -Boole.jpg )
Today I learned what is probably the most beautiful set of equations I've seen in my life. Behold, gentlemen, the three laws of classical logic in Boole's notation (1847):

PI: x = x
PC: x(1-x) = 0
PEM: x+(1-x) = 1

x is any given class
1 is the universal class
0 is the empty class
sum is the (disjoint) union of classes
product is the intersection of classes
PI is the Principle of Identity
PC is the Principle of Contradiction
PEM is the Principle of Excluded Middle

Basic definitions could be rewritten as follows:

xx = x
0x = 0
1x = 1

...but (1-x) (the complementary class of x) cannot be defined without recurring to PC and PEM, which proves their need a priori in order to define the universe (of discourse) in terms of any given class.

That is... I was... it just blew my mind.
I might even have it framed or in a t-shirt.
>> No. 2780 [Edit]
Moreover, taking these results fully into the realm of usual algebra (which is perfectly valid as long as x only takes the values of 1 and 0, meaning that all the propositions are meant to be assertoric), it seems possible to prove a certain idea that I've been chasing for years (and which is central for my still unfinished thesis): that the Principle of Contradiction is foundational for philosophy insofar as the rational study of a world founded in an ontology of identity, since that the laws of classical logic follow each other (duh) logically; I mean, that: PI => PC => PEM.

I've noticed De Morgan laws can also be used to try and prove this; but I'd have to translate them into modern terms and that would be too abusive. On the other hand, Boole's own notation and open intent to render a system that allows full logical and algebraic equivalence (that is, the first true mathematical logic, rather than mere logic-fashioned maths) allows me to attempt this proofs a bit more confidently. And I think they could more or less go as follow:

Let xϵ{0,1} [notice that x=xx holds true there]

=> x(1-x) = x(1-x) = x - xx [but x=xx]
=> x(1-x) = x-x = 0
.: PI => PC

x(1-x) = 0
=> x-xx = 0 [ but x=xx ]
=> x -x = 0
=> 1 + (x -x) = 1 + 0 = 1
=> x + (1-x) = 1 [commutativity and associativity of +]
.: PC => PEM

With that, I could maybe help another argument about the entire history of rational philosophy, from Parmenides to the failure of the Viena Circle, as a full closed circle ("a snake that bites his tail") concerning the possibilities of PC as an epistemological form of truth... and which failed, thus leaving us in the unstable non-identical (virtual/phantasmagoric) ontology of postmodernity.
>> No. 2781 [Edit]
Does it really have to be unstable, esoteric and weird though? Can't postmodernists just shift to a system that deals with contradictions a bit more gracefully instead of going full retard?

Also, pretty neat explanation. Reminded me I should study more algebraic logic.
>> No. 2786 [Edit]
>Can't postmodernists just shift to a system that deals with contradictions
Of course they can and they do! Heck, not just postmodernists: hardcore scientists do it (as they always did) on a daily basis, acting wildly pragmatic and idiosyncratic in their practice (using classical mechanics for launching rockets and quantum mechanics for the computers that collect the data). The epistemological point is to acknowledge that we're doing it, at least...

The problem, I think, is that maybe the ways I (or some philosophers) put it often come out as a luddite re-mystification of the world, while in fact is modernity going no brakes and full force: the hipermodernity, where even the last myth (the objectivity of scientific discourse) was debunked. It's not going back to the realm of unwarranted faith, but towards an extreme skepticism that leaves us only with hyper-specific universes of discourse (including interdisciplinary studies) and their respective truth-value systems.

Is this conclusion (that the pursuing of reality ended in its obliteration, that is, not its ending but the depriving of it) shocking and grotesque? By all means, yes. But it's ostensibly the way it happened and, rather than deny it, postmodernists try to come to terms with it and exploit it the best possible way.
>> No. 2793 [Edit]
File 141934686677.jpg - (36.39KB , 555x479 , Laws of Logic -Boole.jpg )
Btw, I fucked up before (as usual):

1x = x , of course.

If anything, 1+x=1 but the disjointness of union forbids it for x≠0, just like that x+x=x for all x or that x+0=x for x=0. Fortunately, I didn't use any of those in the previous proof; I did use that 1+0=1 but that has sense because 1(0)=0 (i.e. being and nothing are disjoint classes), which is obtainable from the same corrected iii:1x=x with x=0.
>> No. 2795 [Edit]
File 141945911895.jpg - (384.77KB , 839x2182 , consist-id (TRASH).jpg )
Actually, x+0=x for x=0 too since 00=0 (obtainable from i:xx=x for x=0). I guess x+0=0 really stands for all x, which results pretty convenient; however, I still need a logical interpretation of -x alone.

I thought I could define:

x-y = x(1-y)

i.e. the difference between x and y as the intersection of x and the complementary class of y; it makes perfect sense and that way x-x=x(1-x)=0 ...but that would be using PC already, ruining my PI => PC proof. However, apart from that proof the definition apparently stands and from there maybe I could define:

-y = 1-y = 1(1-y)

i.e. the intersection between the universe and the complementary class of y; that way x-y=x(1-y) as well and I'd have a direct definition for all -x, allowing me to really use <{0,1},+,0> as an abelian group as I did in PC => PEM. However, what interests me the most is if PI => PC (so that ¬PC => ¬PI)...

I don't know. This isn't as easy as one could think and it's neither the first time I try to prove a logical implication (or even equivalence) between PI and PC. I tried to do it with contemporary 1st order logic and it seemed ok (pic related), before been completely torn out by an actually competent logician that reviewed it.

Maybe I'm just wrong and there's no such implication between PI and PC. Most probably I'm just dumb, either way.
>> No. 2797 [Edit]
>I guess x+0=0 really stands for all x
I meant x+0=x, of course.
This is why I will never make it.
>> No. 2798 [Edit]
Not really remystification of the world, but of philosophy itself.
It seems they just went from the, however unsuccesful, somewhat sharp and well-grounded approach of the analyticists back to throwing whatever at the unknown and guessing what(if anything) sticked, perhaps in a more frantic and deranged pace. It just reeks of desperation and impatience to throw everything in the air rather than to, say, carry over whatever can be salvaged from the analytic program to a, rigorous, paraconsistent framework and continue your work there.
>> No. 2801 [Edit]
File 142043018054.jpg - (62.02KB , 500x375 , implosion-lain.jpg )
>Not really remystification of the world, but of philosophy itself.
That's interesting because Deleuze, for instance, considered Wittgenstein:

"a philosophical catastrophe [...] a massive regression of philosophy as a whole. It's a very sad affair; they have established a regime of terror which, pretending to do something big and new, only set up utter poverty as grandeur. There are no words to describe the danger within that; and it's not the first time that happens: it's a recurrent danger. They are evil, the wittgensteinians; they're up to destroy everything and, if they effectively have it their way, that would certainly be the murder of philosophy."

---And would that be grievous?
[Claire Parnet asks]

"Oh, yes! absolutely. We must be very vigilant about it."

On that improvised little speech, Deleuze was obviously making a figurative simile between analytics and fascists, insofar as a totalitarian and oversimplified worldview that seeks to eliminate all possibility of difference and diversity, which he considered not just absolutely necessary for innovation and survival but the true spirit of left wing: the conviction that all humanity is in the end some instance of the so called "minorities", since the neutral subject/citizen has always being nothing but a straw man made by the state to be used oppressively.

However, even letting aside that political undertone, if we consider that Wittgenstein himself used pretty much the same terms to refer to his work (the end of philosophy, or philosophy as something that should not to change anything but leave everything exactly as it is) and expected his name to be remembered just in the same fashion as the Library of Alexandria's burner, Deleuze's words still make full sense: the success of the analytical tradition would not had been the "positive stage" of philosophy but its obliteration, since they were eager to forever ban philosophy's main activity ---in words of Deleuze: the (contingent and increasingly enriched) production of concepts, with full capability of shaping our lives--- and reduce it into a mere ahistorical grammar checker‎ bot for scientists' papers.

Personally, as a huge fan of Wittgenstein, Deleuze's words hurt me a lot and I resisted to swallow them for as long as I could. But I just had to give up when, as mentioned before, I realized that Vienna's Circle failure was precisely arriving to a limit form of truth that was nothing but the very same one that jumpstarted philosophy about 2600 years ago: inner consistency of discourse, which is indeed absolutely no guaranty of "reality" or truth at all (as Schilck himself admitted, disheartened); if that was not literally a full regression of philosophy indeed, I don't know what it is.

So, postmoderns, I do believe, saved the fundamental human (or just western? I don't know) activity that is philosophy and its heritage, including logic and maths' own history and achievements. I mean, the system had crashed and some sacrifice had to be made in order to go on: either philosophy or reality, someone just had to burn; postmoderns chose reality (I mean, the notion and its prosecution) and, after years of struggle, I came up to think that they did the right thing.
>> No. 2803 [Edit]
File 142049571638.jpg - (73.23KB , 435x616 , Witt.jpg )
Fortunately, though maybe not a large part of his followers could, Wittgenstein did manage to realize some of his mistakes which is why he restarted philosophical inquiry some time after his vow of silence at the end of the Tractatus. Here's a little clip from the movie "Wittgenstein" (surprisingly good), about how Wittgenstein himself changed his view on language and philosophy (well, at least partially) towards the Philosophical Investigations:

Basically, in his late work he concluded to defend, if not the possibility of fully visible univocal meaning, at least the pragmatic need of an ontological commitment with any given language game we participate on, in order to live through it at all. Simply put, we have to believe in the functional reality of what we speak of because: "I must not saw off the branch on which I am sitting".
>> No. 2808 [Edit]
Nihilism is really the only thing that makes sense.
>> No. 2810 [Edit]
I'm pretty sure that if that were the case, most philosophers would agree with you. But that's not the case.

Also please explain what aspects of nihilism you think are the ones that make so much more sense than anything that's opposed to them.
>> No. 2811 [Edit]
The base idea that life has no meaning or intrinsic value. From an objective standpoint, those things can't even exist.
>> No. 2812 [Edit]
That's definitely hard to refute, if at all. The thing is though that from that belief alone you can't really go anywhere. It's a dead end. It's like anti-philosophy.

But you probably still hold other beliefs and do things that have nothing to do with the objective meaningless of life. I do at least. It's pretty hard if not impossible to avoid after all.

So what most philosophy does (or should do at least) is settle for something like least common denominators, even if they're not really objective, and put the things we believe and do in perspective to those. It might not make more sense than just saying "everything's meaningless and all bets are off", but at least it makes us feel like we're getting somewhere.
>> No. 2814 [Edit]
File 14210216887.png - (2.23KB , 236x214 , love heart.png )
Today I had this idea. I have to work on it (ordering the discussion and making the graphics, which are several), but if I'm correct I think I can make a mathematical diagrammatic modeling of the functioning of love (love and hate, in fact), serving from credited philosophical and literary notions, set theory, algebra (concept of group) and a metaphorical resemblance with the chemical concept of pH (similar to the tsundere-yandere spectrum, though we know that one can be misleading).

I still have other stuff to do and I should talk about this with one of my old teachers, but I want to do this and will post it here whenever is done.
>> No. 2815 [Edit]
Baby don't hurt me.
>> No. 2816 [Edit]
Yeah, that too.
>> No. 2818 [Edit]
I gave it a first full run in my head (took me hours straight).

It might not work after all.

It does work to a certain extent, but not as much as I need to explain some things and then, trying to include them forcibly, it lose all mathematical and chemical correlate and became extremely esoteric (a pile of bullshit).

In any case, I ended up with not one but five different diagrams of possible love/hate activity. The one that fits me the most is the worst justified, if at all. Oh, well.
>> No. 2819 [Edit]
>do things that have nothing to do with the objective meaningless of life
Well, not really. Yes, according to nihilist teachings there is no reason to do anything, but it is also true that there is no reason to refrain from doing anything either. It's not like I can prevent myself from doing what I do, because that's impossible. One cannot have any kind of action or inaction that would make it so that they did not believe in nihilism.
>> No. 2820 [Edit]
People don't just do something or refrain from doing something. They do specific things as opposed to other things and they refrain from doing specific things as opposed to other things, which makes it pretty obvious there's some kind of purpose in the back of their heads, whether they want it to be there or not. And that purpose is subjective meaning. It's pretty easy to deny objective meaning, but I want to meet the nihilistic saint who has also managed to get rid of that subjective meaning. Or watch them from a safe distance rather.

What I'm getting at is: People who have realized there's no objective meaning in life can pat themselves on the back. They've gotten farther than a lot of other people. But they shouldn't believe they've actually solved anything. They've just noticed something pretty obvious. And as long as there's subjective meaning, they might want to call themselves something like anti-objectivists rather than nihilists, and then find out which subjective meanings make the most sense.

>One cannot have any kind of action or inaction that would make it so that they did not believe in nihilism.
I don't think I understand this sentence. Are you saying everyone believes in "nihilism", i.e. that life has no objective meaning? Because I'm sure I've already met a few people who don't. Not all of those people might make much sense, but it's not like they don't believe what they say.
>> No. 2825 [Edit]
I found a nice section about nihilism in Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil:

"Der Eifer und die Feinheit, ich möchte sogar sagen: Schlauheit, mit denen man heute überall in Europa dem Probleme "von der wirklichen und der scheinbaren Welt" auf den Leib rückt, giebt zu denken und zu horchen; und wer hier im Hintergrunde nur einen "Willen zur Wahrheit" und nichts weiter hört, erfreut sich gewiss nicht der schärfsten Ohren. In einzelnen und seltenen Fällen mag wirklich ein solcher Wille zur Wahrheit, irgend ein ausschweifender und abenteuernder Muth, ein Metaphysiker-Ehrgeiz des verlornen Postens dabei betheiligt sein, der zuletzt eine Handvoll "Gewissheit" immer noch einem ganzen Wagen voll schöner Möglichkeiten vorzieht; es mag sogar puritanische Fanatiker des Gewissens geben, welche lieber noch sich auf ein sicheres Nichts als auf ein ungewisses Etwas sterben legen. Aber dies ist Nihilismus und Anzeichen einer verzweifelnden sterbensmüden Seele: wie tapfer auch die Gebärden einer solchen Tugend sich ausnehmen mögen."

The zeal and precision, I'd even say prudence with which people everywhere in Europe approach the problem of the actual and the apparent world nowadays makes you think and listen closely; and whoever only hears a will to the truth in the background certainly doesn't have the best ears. In particular and rare cases such a will to the truth, some extravagant and adventurous courage, a metaphysicist's ambition of a lost position might really be part of it, which in the end prefers a handful of certainty over a wagon full of beautiful possibilities; there might even be puritanical fanatics of the certain who'd rather die with a certain nothing than with an uncertain something. But that's nihilism and sign of a desperate soul tired to death, no matter how brave the gestures of such a virtue might seem.

He then goes on to say that a lot of people who are stronger than those nihilists at least try to reconquer something, even if it's just something from the past like an immortal soul, which they should know they can't really get back. But he thinks they actually don't really want to go back to those old optimistic ideas but rather just get away from our modern pessimistic ideas. And if they had more "power, flight, courage, artistry", they wouldn't want to get away by going back but by breaking out, which seems to be the solution in his opinion. But he doesn't elaborate on it in that section.
>> No. 2826 [Edit]
And not much later this appreciative comment about (some) subjective opinions:

" 42. A new order of philosophers is appearing; I shall venture to baptize them by a name not without danger. As far as I understand them, as far as they allow themselves to be understood — for it is their nature to WISH to remain something of a puzzle — these philosophers of the future might rightly, perhaps also wrongly, claim to be designated as "tempters." This name itself is after all only an attempt, or, if it be preferred, a temptation.

43. Will they be new friends of "truth," these coming philosophers? Very probably, for all philosophers hitherto have loved their truths. But assuredly they will not be dogmatists. It must be contrary to their pride, and also contrary to their taste, that their truth should still be truth for every one — that which has hitherto been the secret wish and ultimate purpose of all dogmatic efforts. "My opinion is MY opinion: another person has not easily a right to it" — such a philosopher of the future will say, perhaps. One must renounce the bad taste of wishing to agree with many people. "Good" is no longer good when one's neighbour takes it into his mouth. And how could there be a "common good"! The expression contradicts itself; that which can be common is always of small value. In the end things must be as they are and have always been — the great things remain for the great, the abysses for the profound, the delicacies and thrills for the refined, and, to sum up shortly, everything rare for the rare."
>> No. 2829 [Edit]
>being no longer a teenager and still basing your views of life on some shit some old white man wrote centuries ago on around his sixties rather than on your own experiences as a person.

Your life, guys, must be really sad.

No offense.

there was really necessary to relate that to megucas in any fucking way?
>> No. 2830 [Edit]

Ideally, you should take into consideration the experiences of others as well as your own. There is no need to choose one over the other.
>> No. 2831 [Edit]
Does old, white men intimidate you?
>> No. 2832 [Edit]
He knows he will never be nearly as intelligent as those old white men that lived centuries ago.
>> No. 2835 [Edit]
Fools learn from experience, the wise learn from history.
---Urobuchi-butchered Bismarck

PROTIP: this last statement was extremely Hegelian and you could always counter strike it with Heidegger's or Sartre's existential ethics; they're from past century, white but not always old and definitely not bearded.
>> No. 2862 [Edit]
I think that the meaning of philosophy is really just analysis and judgment. How would you sum up what the term means to you?
>> No. 2864 [Edit]
Non-whites can gtfo.
>> No. 2866 [Edit]
Figuring out problems that doesn't have a solution, duh.
>> No. 2875 [Edit]
I don't think philosophy per se has a meaning, but a task. Following the western tradition, from Socrates to Deleuze, I would say the task of philosophy is the crafting of ideas/concepts (just like, say, carpenters craft wooden furniture, mathematicians craft theorems and directors craft movies) that render meaning possible at all. Therefore, although mostly unaware of their origin and evolution, we all make use of philosophers' work (just like we use furniture, applied maths, movies, etc).
>> No. 2891 [Edit]
Whites can gtfo.
>> No. 2946 [Edit]
I rred some excerpts of his book (including the ending, ke) and found them really... meaningful? brilliant? So I'm actually going to read Geschlecht und Charakter. Has anyone else here rred him?
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